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Abstract—Currently, resource sharing and system security are
critical issues. This paper proposes a POL module composed of
PRIV ILEGE attribute (PA), obligation and log which improves
attribute based access control (ABAC) model in dynamically granting
authorizations and revoking authorizations. The following describes
the new model termed PABAC in terms of the POL module
structure, attribute definitions, policy formulation and authorization
architecture, which demonstrate the advantages of it. The POL
module addresses the problems which are not predicted before and
not described by access control policy. It can be one of the subject
attributes or resource attributes according to the practical application,
which enhances the flexibility of the model compared with ABAC.
A scenario that illustrates how this model is applied to the real world
is provided.
Keywords—Access control, attribute based access control, granting
authorizations, privilege, revoking authorizations, system security.
I. INTRODUCTION
ACCESS control [1] is a technology used in almost everysystem, such as a computer system or an enterprise
management system. It permits legally authorized subjects
to access protected resources; prohibits legal subjects from
unauthorized access to protected resources; prevents illegal
subjects from accessing protected resources. Nowadays, the
mainstream access control models are mandatory access
control (MAC) [2], discretionary access control (DAC) [3],
role based access control (RBAC) [4], task based access
control (TBAC) [5] and attributed based access control
(ABAC) [6].
Many researchers have investigated ABAC model, which
is applied in web service, cloud computing, collaborative
environment and so on. Reference [7] utilizes the characteristic
that security information is spread over a number of attribute
and policy authorities in ABAC model and compares ABAC
model with RBAC model to further elaborate on the
advantages of ABAC model. Reference [8] takes advantage
of the characteristic that policy authorization based attributes
can protect the user privacy. In [9], the access control policies
are made based the users previous behavior. The much
contribution a user makes, the more permission he or she
is granted. ABAC is not only applied in different fields but
also more flexible than other access control models. ABAC
describes the subject, resource, operation and environment
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with attributes. Each attribute is defined according to the
practical application which improves the flexible of ABAC
model. ABAC makes the access control policies based one
or more attributes and evaluates the value of them to judge
whether the subject can access the resource or not. That is to
say, the subject can access the resource only through parts of
his or her attributes which is different from the other access
control models and protects the subject privacy. Besides, the
way of authorization based attributes in ABAC model also
achieves large-scale authorization and the policies can be
modified dynamically.
However, though ABAC model has many merits in
application, it is also necessary to take revoking authorization
flexibly into consideration. If the authorization cannot be
revoked in time, it may carry significant security risks to the
system. In the real world, a lot of authorizations are used only
once or several times. If these authorizations are stored in the
policy repository not revoked for a long time, the problem of
the policy repository explosion and policy conflict may occur.
Thus, how to revoke the authorizations in time is the research
contents in this paper.
This paper proposes a POL module and combines it with
ABAC model, termed PABAC model. PABAC is also based
on attributes, including subject attribute, resource attribute,
operation attribute and environment attribute. The environment
attribute has been used to judge the current situation state
of the system. POL module is composed of PRIV ILEGE
attribute (PA), obligation and log. POL module can be one
of the subject attributes or resource attributes. This paper
takes the POL module as one of the resource attributes as an
example to illustrate the structure of PABAC. Due to it, each
resource has been managed by the only one subject, termed
PRIV ILEGE manager (PM). However, a PM manages one
or more resources and has the permission to modify the
PA value of these resources. When the environment attribute
detects that the current system state is abnormal, POL module
allows the PM to authorize based one or more subject attributes
with modifying the PA. Once the subject has been authorized
access, the subject executes the obligation before or after
the authorized access. Thus, obligation is used to revoke the
PRIV ILEGE directly or gives the information feedback of
the authorized access. The PA can also be used to address
the problems including the unforeseeable problem and the
problem not described by access control policies. That is
to say, PABAC makes use of the PA to authorize access
and the obligation to revoke it which achieves granting and
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revoking authorization dynamically. Besides, the authorization
to a subject in ABAC needs to make a complex access control
policy rule involved a lot of attributes but PABAC don’t
need. The following illustrates PABAC model in terms of
the structure, attribute definition and access control policy in
detail.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II interprets the
related work including the introduction of ABAC model and
obligation; Section III details the core model components,
POL module, the policies of access control and obligation in
PABAC model; Section VI describes a scenario for illustrating
the application method; Section V summarizes the whole
thesis and provides the future development tendency.
II. RELATED WORK
A. ABAC
ABAC is a logical access control model that controls access
to resources by evaluating rules against the attributes of
entities (subject and resource), operations, and the environment
relevant to a request [10]. ABAC uses attributes as the basis for
authorizations instead of directly defining permissions between
subjects and resources. When adding a role as a subject
attribute, ABAC is a superset of RBAC [11].
The relations of the attributes and the basic architecture of
ABAC in [12] are shown in Fig. 1.
(a) (b)
Fig. 1 (a) Relations of attributes. (b) Architecture of ABAC
However, there is also some problems existed in ABAC.
When the emergency situation happens, it is difficult to
handle with the access control policy predefined. When some
authorizations only used once or several times, ABAC cannot
revoke them flexibly, which may lead to the problem of the
policy repository explosion. Besides, the problem of the policy
conflict also exists in ABAC model. PABAC adds a PA in
ABAC which can authorize access in abnormal situations
and revokes the authorization with obligation. The way to
dynamically grant and revoke authorizations addresses the
problem of the policy repository explosion. The authorization
to a subject in ABAC also needs to make a complex access
control policy rule involved a lot of attributes but PABAC don’t
need.
B. Obligation
Obligations express the actions that must be executed
before or after granted access [13]. Thus, obligation has been
categorized in two types: provisions are those conditions that
need to be satisfied or actions that must be performed before
a decision is rendered; obligations are those conditions or
actions that must be fulfilled by either the users or the system
after the decision [14]. In the following, the provisions have
been termed pre-obligation while the obligations have been
termed post-obligation.
Obligation can not only control accesses independently but
also combine with other access control models. Such as [15]
is the combination of obligation and RBAC model. Thus,
PABAC introduces the obligation into the ABAC model. When
the subject has been granted access, the subject needs to give
an information feedback in order to revoke the PRIV ILEGE
in time. That is to say, when not in use, the PRIV ILEGE
are revoked by PM and the PRIV ILEGE can be assigned to
other subjects. Thus, PABAC improves the flexible of revoking
authorizations.
III. PABAC MODEL
This section introduces the PABAC model, in terms of the
attribute and policy definition, the POL module in detail. POL
module is composed of PA, obligation and log which will
be detailed in the following. POL module can be one of
the subject attributes or resource attributes which is based
practical application. When the number and kind of subjects
are enormous, POL module is one of subject attributes; when
the number and kind of resources are enormous, POL module
is one of resource attributes. These two methods make it easy
to add, modify or revoke the PRIV ILEGE. This paper
takes the POL module to be one of the resources attributes
as example to introduce the PABAC.
A. Core Model Components
1) Subject Attribute (SA): A subject is a human user or
non-person entity, such as a device that issues access requests
to perform operations on resources while subjects are assigned
one or more attributes [6]. Subject attribute in PABAC is
defined as (s, ...). Each subject (abbreviated to s) has a unique
id termed subject id in the system. Meanwhile, whether s and
other attributes are described as a set of integer or name is
determined according to the actual application.
2) Resource Attribute (RA): A resource can be managed by
the ABAC system or a requested entity, as well as anything
upon which an operation may be performed by a subject
including data, applications, services, devices, and networks
[6]. Each resource (abbreviated to r) has a unique resource id
and owns a POL module. PABAC also needs to know who is
the PRIV ILEGE administrator of the resource. Thus, the
resource attribute in PABAC is defined as (r, POL, PM, ...).
3) Operation Attribute (OA): An operation is the execution
of a function at the request of a subject upon a resource
[6]. The operation attribute values are represented by a set of
unique operation types, termed o in the system. Furthermore,
system can define different operation types in different actual
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application, such as read, write, edit, delete, copy, execute,
modify and so on.
4) Environment Attribute (EA): The definition of the
environment attributes in PABAC is operational or situational
context in which access requests occur [6]. For environment
attributes, attribute authentication is based on conditions in
the environment when a request is made in ABAC [16].
Furthermore, the environment attributes are very special
attributes according to the detection, including the current
time, day of week or the current threat level. In PABAC, EA
has been used to detect the current system states including the
normal situation and the abnormal situation which is defined in
the following. Thus, different access control policies is made
according to the different system states. Thus, the environment
attribute in PABAC is defined as (CurrentState(CS), ...).
Fig. 2 Architecture of POL module
5) POL Module: Fig. 2 shows that POL module is
composed of PA, obligation and log. This paper is taking the
POL module to be one of the RA as an example, so the PM
who is the owner or manager of the resource can manage
its PA. Each resource has only one PM while the PM of the
multiple resources can be the same subject.
• PRIV ILEGE: under the abnormal situation, system
authorizes the access based one or more subject attributes
though the PA in POL module. PA in POL module
is a pair, described as (SA,OA). SA refers to one or
more subject attributes while OA refers to one or more
operations. If the POL module is one of the subject
attributes, the PA is described as (OA,RA). When the
subject only want to access the resource once or several
times, the PM of the resource authorizes the access
through modifying its PA in POL module.
• Obligation expresses the operations that must be executed
before or after the authorized access [13]. That is to say,
after being authorized access, the subject needs to give an
access information feedback to the PM. PM revokes the
PRIV ILEGE according to the information feedback
or obligation revokes the PRIV ILEGE directly after a
certain time.
• Log records each operation in abnormal situations. When
the system administrator finds an unsafe operation in log,
the system administrator can take remedial actions to
ensure the system security.
The PA in the POL module makes it flexible to manage the
permission. Under the abnormal situation, the PM manages the
PAs which makes it flexible for subject gaining authorizations.
The abnormal situations is common in the real world, so
PABAC improves availability of ABAC by introducing the
POL module. When some permission used only once or
several times, PABAC revokes them by obligations which
addresses the problem of the policy repository explosion.
B. Access Control Policy
1) Attribute Expression: Attribute expression is a relation
between the attributes and attributes or attributes and attribute
values through the mathematical symbols. There are n subject
attributes and m resource attributes. V (SA), V (RA) express
one of the subject and resource attribute values respectively.
The formalized definition of attribute expression is described
as follows:
AE : {SA1 | SA2 | ... | SAn | RA1 | RA2 | ... | RAm
| V (SA1) | V (SA2) | ... | V (SAn)
| V (RA1) | V (RA2) | ... | V (RAm)}
Operator
{SA1 | SA2 | ... | SAn | RA1 | RA2 | ... | RAm
| V (SA1) | V (SA2) | ... | V (SAn)
| V (RA1) | V (RA2) | ... | V (RAm)}
Operator = {+,−,=, <,>,÷,×,∈ ...}
For example, the information system defines User =
{Subjectid = 1, Age = 30, ...} and Resource = {Id =
4, Managerid = 1, ...}. The subject id and age of the user
refer to SA1 and SA2 respectively while 1 and 30 refer to
one of the user’s id values and age values respectively, so
both ”Subjectid(s) = 1” and ”Age(s) = 30” are attribute
expressions. The manage id of the resource refers to RA2,
so ”Subjectid(s) = Manageid(r)” is also an attribute
expression. Thus, attribute expressions are the way of policy
evaluation which determines whether the subject can access
or not.
2) PA Set Operation: The PA is designed as a set. PM
grants and revokes authorization dynamically through the set
operations. There are three resources termed r1, r2 and r3
while PA(r1), PA(r2) and PA(r3) represent the PA sets of
r1, r2 and r3 respectively. Thus, the set operations applied
among PA sets are defined as follows termed Action:
Action1 : PA(r1) = PA(r2).
Action2 : PA(r1) = PA(r2)− PA(r3)
= {x | x ∈ PA(r1) ∧ x /∈ PA(r2)}.
Action3 : PA(r1) = PA(r2) ∪ PA(r3)
= {x | x ∈ PA(r2) ∨ x ∈ PA(r3)}.
Action4 : PA(r1) = PA(r2) ∩ PA(r3)
= {x | x ∈ PA(r2) ∧ x ∈ PA(r3)}.
Action1 expresses the PA set of r1 can equal to the PA set
of r2 directly; Action2 expresses the PA set of r1 can equal
to different set between the PA set of r2 and the PA set of
r3; Action3 expresses the PA set of r1 can equal to union
set between the PA set of r2 and the PA set of r3; Action4
expresses the PA set of r1 can equal to intersection between
the PA set of r2 and the PA set of r3. The Actions defined
above can reduce the operations of defining the same type
resource. The PA set also supports to add and delete one PA
element. Thus, It is flexible to design PA as a set.
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3) Basic Policy Model: The PABAC policy model is
defined based on [7] under normal situation (NS):
(1) SAk(1 ≤ k ≤ 4), RAm(1 ≤ m ≤ 2) and OAn(n = 1)
are the predefined attributes for subjects, resources, and
operations, respectively;
(2) ATTR(s), ATTR(r), and ATTR(o) represent attribute
assignment relations for subjects, resources and operations,
respectively, which address all attribute values:
ATTR(s) ⊆ SA1 ∪ SA2 ∪ SA3 ∪ SA4
ATTR(r) ⊆ RA1 ×RA1
ATTR(o) ⊆ OA
Policy is the representation of rules or relationships that
makes it possible to determine if a requested access should
be allowed, given the values of the attributes of the subject,
resource, and possibly environment conditions. Thus, under
the normal situation, the access control policy in PABAC is
defined as follows:
Rule1 :
can access(s, r, o, e)
← f(ATTR(s), ATTR(r), ATTR(o), ATTR(e)).
4) Abnormal Situations (AS): The abnormal situations
includes temporary situation, emergency situation, special
situation and so on. Thus, PABAC makes the access control
rules based these three situations above as follows:
Rule2 :
can access(s, r, o, e)
← (ID(s) = PM(r) ∧OA(o) = Action
∧ CS(e) = AS).
Rule3 :
can access(s, r, o, e)
← ((s, o) ∈ PA(r) ∧ CS(e) = AS).
When the abnormal situations happen, Rule2 permits the
PM modifies the PA values; The value (s, o) can be got
by computing ”ATTR(s) × ATTR(o)”; Rule3 determines
whether the subject has the PRIV ILEGE to access the
resource through comparing the values of (s, o) and the PA
values. That is to say, only when the PM modifies the PA
values by Rule2, the subject is granted PRIV ILEGE to
perform the operation on the resource. Since the subject has
been granted the PRIV ILEGE, the subject must execute the
operations defined in obligation before or after the authorized
access. Thus, the policy in obligation has been defined
according to [13] as follow:
Rule4 :
Obligation = (Subject, T rigger,Operation).
In Rule4, subject refers to who has been granted the
authorization by the PA and needs to execute the obligation;
trigger refers to the conditions that the subject executes the
obligation; operation refers to the operation type that the
subject takes. The subject must execute the operations before
or after the authorized access, such as when the resource is not
used any more, the subject needs to inform the resource PM
by signaling or others. The PM deletes the PRIV ILEGE in
PA values by Rule2. The operations above must be recorded
in the log, so the log has been defined as follows:
Rule5 :
Log = (Subject, Operation,Resource,Action, T ime).
The time includes the time of the subject doing operation on
the resource and executing the obligation.
The authorization in ABAC is based on the evaluation of
access control policy rules. This way is difficult to revoke
permission that are only used by once or several times. PABAC
divides the system into the normal situation and the abnormal
situation through the POL module. Under the normal situation,
the subject accesses the resource based the access control
policies. Under the abnormal situations, the subject obtains
the temporal permission through the PM of the resource. The
authorization in PABAC is more flexible and dynamic and the
permission can be granted and revoked easily by modifying
the PA values. The system administrator ensures the system
security by checking the log.
C. Architecture of PABAC
Fig. 3 Architecture of PABAC model
This architecture in Fig. 3 integrates XACML in
real implementations. XACML (eXtensible Access Control
Markup Language) is an OASIS standard that describes both
a policy language implemented in XML and an access control
decision request/response language implemented in XML [17].
The XACML profile specifies four main actors in PABAC
model to handle access decisions according to [18]:
• Policy administration point (PAP): The system entity
creates a policy or policy set.
• Policy information point (PIP): The system entity acts as
a source of attribute values. That is to say, PIP is the point
where the necessary attributes for the policy evaluation
are retrieved from several external or internal actors [19].
• Policy enforcement point (PEP): The system entity
performs access control by making decision requests and
enforcing authorization decisions.
• Policy decision point (PDP): The system entity evaluates
applicable policy and renders an authorization decision.
When the environment attribute detects that the current
system state is the normal situation, PIP collects the attributes
that is relevant to the access including subject attributes,
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resource attributes, operation attributes; PAP looks up the
access control policy that is relevant to the access; PDP
evaluates the attribute values by access control policy rules
and returns the evaluation result to PEP. If the result is
true, the access request is permitted; if the result is false,
the access request is denied. If there is no access control
policy rules that is relevant to the access request, return
inapplicable and the access request is denied. When the
environment attribute detects that the current system state
is the abnormal situation, PIP collects the attributes that is
relevant to the access including subject attributes, resource
attributes, operation attributes; PDP computes ”SO = SA ×
OA” first and then computes ”SP = SO ∩ PA(r)”. If SP
is a nonempty set, the access request is permitted and the
obligation may be executed; If SP is an empty set, the access
request is denied.
IV. AN ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO
This section takes an emergency operation in hospital as
an example to illustrate PABAC model. The patient is taken
to hospital due to falling ill suddenly. The situation cannot
be predicted, so the access control policy rules in the normal
situation are not appropriate and cannot judge which operating
room is unoccupied. The operative time of each operation
also cannot be estimated, so the system is hard to manage
it with time constraint. This section describes the attributes
in scenario first; makes the access control policy rules in the
abnormal situation including emergency operation; defines the
obligations in this emergency operation; illustrates the mode
of operation in the whole scenario.
A. Attribute Definitions
In hospital, all the patients, nurses and doctors have a name,
an age and a unique id. Thus, the subject attribute is defined
as follows:
SA = {ID,Name,Age}.
ID is composed of a letter and some positive integers. First
bit in ID is P ,N andD which represents the patient, nurse and
doctor respectively; The positive integer assignment is based
on when the subject enters into the system. For example, P10
refers to the patient whose number is 10. Name is composed
of letters while Age ranges from 0 to 200. All the operating
rooms, departments and wards have a unique name and a
manager. Thus, the resource attribute is defined as follows:
RA = {Name,Manager, PRIV ILEGE}.
Name refers to the resource name or id; Manager refers
to the subject ID who manage the resource; PRIV ILEGE
refers to the PA value set of the resource which is composed
of (s, o). Besides, the operation attribute is also defined as
follows:
OA = {Type}.
Type includes create, modify, delete and Action which
has been described above. The environment attribute in this
scenario is also defined as follows:
EA = {CurrentState(CS)}.
The current state values in the system is normal situation
(NS) and abnormal situation (AS). The abnormal situation
refers to the patient who falls ill suddenly or the situation
cannot be predicted before. With a simple analysis, the
attributes in the scenario has been defined completely.
B. Access Control Policy
Under the normal situation, hospital manages the subjects
and resources with the access control policy rules predefined.
The abnormal situation, such as the emergency operation,
cannot be predicted before, so hospital needs to manage the
subjects and resources flexible. According to the access control
policy rules in PABAC, this hospital system defines additional
rules as follows:
Rule6 :
can access(s, r, o, e)
← (ID(s) = Manager(r)) ∧ Type(o) = Action
∧ CS(e) = AS).
Rule7 :
can access(s, r, o, e)
← ((s, o) ∈ PRIV ILEGE(r) ∧ CS(e) = AS).
Rule6 refers that only when the subject ID is equal to the
Manager id of the resource, the subject can take operations
which has been defined in the Action above on the value of
the resource PRIV ILEGE. Rule7 computes ”SA × OA”
to get a set of (s, o) values first, and then judges whether
one of the (s, o) values belongs to the PRIV ILEGE of the
resource to determine whether the subject is authorized. Under
the abnormal situation, if one of the (s, o) values belongs to
the PRIV ILEGE of the resource, the subject is allowed to
access the resource; if none of the (s, o) values belong to
the PRIV ILEGE of the resource, the subject is disallowed
to access the resource. Under the normal situation, system
evaluates the access control policy rules based attributes.
If the evaluation result is true, the subject can access the
resource; if the evaluation result is false, the subject cannot
access the resource; if there is no access control policy rules
that is relevant to the access request, the evaluation result is
inapplicable and the subject cannot access the resource.
C. Obligation Policy
This section takes an emergency operation in hospital as an
example to define the following obligation policy:
Policy before the surgery{
Subject = D10.
Operation = Occupy.
Resource = Operating room 1.
T rigger = Beginning of operating.
Obligation = Turn the operation indicator light on.
}
Policy after the surgery{
Subject = D10.
Operation = Occupy.
Resource = Operating room 1.
T rigger = Operating finished.
Obligation = Turn the operation indicator light off.
}
The obligation policy above includes pre-obligation and
post-obligation. When the doctor whose number is 10 has
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been authorized to have an operation in the operating room 1,
the doctor must finish the operation defined in the obligation.
Doctor 10 gives an information feedback to the manager of
the operating room 1 with turning on or off the operation
indicator light. The manager modifies the PRIV ILEGE of
the operating room 1 to revoke the authorization in time
according to the information feedback. Thus, obligation makes
it easy to manage the authorizations and resources. Compared
with ABAC, PABAC revokes authorizations more flexible with
obligation. When the permission is not in use any more,
the manager of the resource can modify and delete it at
once which addresses the problem of the policy repository
explosion. PABAC only grants the subject authorizations under
the abnormal situation and each operation has been recorded
in the log. Thus, PABAC still ensures the system security.
Besides, the authorization to a subject in ABAC needs to make
a complex access control policy rule involved a lot of attributes
but PABAC doesn’t need.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper describes PABAC with granting and revoking
authorizations dynamically in detail. PABAC applies the POL
module into ABAC model. The manager of the resource grants
the subject authorizations immediately with PA in the POL
module under the abnormal situation. Besides, obligation in
POL module also makes it flexible to revoke the authorization
which addresses the problem that the resources in idle state
cannot be assigned to other subject. Thus, POL module helps
the system to address the problems including not predicted
before and not described by access control policy rules.
Besides, the authorization to a subject in ABAC needs to make
a complex access control policy rule involved a lot of attributes
but PABAC doesn’t need. Log ensures the system security.
POL module can be one of the subject attributes or one of
the resource attributes. When the number and kind of subjects
are enormous, POL module is one of subject attributes; when
the number and kind of resources are enormous, POL module
is one of resource attributes. POL module as different attribute
types makes it easy to manage authorization. Thus, PABAC
can makes different access control policy rules according to
different practical applications which improves the flexible.
Introducing the priority levels into PA is a future research
direction. At present, PABAC cannot address the problem of
policy conflict in fact. Thus, how to define the priority levels is
an urgent problem to be solved, which refines PABAC model.
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